
























Populism and Nationalism in a Comparative Perspective:  
A Scholarly Exchange 
 
Bart Bonikowski, Harvard University 
Daphne Halikiopoulou, University of Reading 
Eric Kaufmann, Birkbeck College, University of London 




The purpose of the Exchange feature is to publish discussions that engage, advance 
and initiate new debates in the study of nations and nationalism. This Exchange 
article is on the subject of ‘Populism and Nationalism’. Each contributor addresses the 
following four questions on the subject: (1) What is populism and what role does it 
play within the context of democratic politics? (2) Does populism cut across left-right 
lines? (3) What is the relationship between nationalism and populism? (4) Are 
contemporary populist movements across Europe and the West comparable? Our aim 
is to generate a thought- provoking conversation with regards to the rise of populism 
in Europe and the West.  
 
Introduction 
Daphne Halikiopoulou, University of Reading 
 
 
Often used as an umbrella term to describe the electoral success of parties and 
individuals that claim to speak on behalf of the ‘pure people’ pitted against a ‘corrupt 
elite’, populism has attracted increasing scholarly attention and dominated headlines 
in recent years. Populism takes many forms, spanning continents and cutting across 
left-right lines. It is often used to describe both parties of the right, such as the French 
Front National (FN), the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the Sweden 
Democrats (SD) and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) among others, that oppose 
immigration and seek to restore national sovereignty; and of the left, such as the 
Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the Spanish PODEMOS, that pit 
the people against an exploitative economic elite. The term has also been used to 
describe the election of Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK. These phenomena 
have often raised concerns about the direction of democratic politics, the rise of the 
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extremes and a form of nationalism that is exclusionary, violent and confrontational. 
Does populism erode democratic politics? Does it cut across left-right lines? What is 
its relationship with nationalism? And are contemporary populist movements across 
Europe and the West comparable, or is populism just a buzzword used to describe 
disparate phenomena?  In this first Exchange article, Bart Bonikowski, Daphne 
Halikiopoulou, Eric Kaufmann and Matthijs Rooduijn address these questions in a 
discussion format. Our aim overall is to advance the debate by exchanging views on 
the various dimensions of the topic that remain controversial.     
 
All contributors see populism as thin-centred and agree on many of its core features: 
anti-pluralism, anti-elitism and the juxtaposition of a virtuous people against elites 
and fifth columns. With regards to the relationship between populism and democracy, 
all contributors agree that populism can be hostile to liberal democracy. According to 
Bonikowski, this hostility has been particularly marked in the politics of the radical 
right that combine populism, nationalism and authoritarianism. Bonikowski and 
Halikiopoulou both agree that populism is not new but that its expression in the 
current era does pose new challenges, centred on the manifestation of populist ideas 
in mainstream politics. According to Kaufmann, populism can be negative insofar as 
it erodes respect for liberal institutions, minorities and reason, the most obvious cases 
being Hungary and Poland. Finally Rooduijn argues that because populism is 
incompatible with the liberal pillar of contemporary democracies, it is accompanied 
by the danger of the ‘tyranny of the majority’. 
 
Their views diverge, however, on whether populism also has a positive role to play in 
democratic politics. Halikiopoulou posits that populism is always negative. Her 
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argument is that, by rejecting liberal democratic institutions and processes, populism 
rejects the very basis upon which our representative democracy is premised. So while 
she agrees that in theory populism is democratic because it draws on the democratic 
‘will of the people’, in practice it is only pseudo-democratic, because the 
implementation of the popular will translates into a rejection of the institutions that 
offer the key checks and balances that make democracies function. Populism is thus 
always conducive to authoritarianism.  
 
Bonikowski, Kaufmann and Rooduijn on the other hand argue that populism is not 
inherently, and not always, a negative force. According to Bonikowski, suggesting 
that populism is necessarily predatory on democratic institutions would entail 
conflating it with authoritarianism. But while the two often coincide, they are in fact 
analytically distinct. If we look beyond the radical right, which combines populism, 
nationalism and authoritarianism, we may observe a form of populism profitably used 
by mainstream political candidates without threatening the norms of democracy, as 
has long been the case in U.S. Furthermore, Kaufmann argues, populism has a role to 
play in invigorating democracy where elitism structures the system. Rooduijn concurs 
that populism can be a force of good as it may serve as a democratic corrective by 
bringing issues ignored by the mainstream to the fore of the political agenda.  
 
With regards to the ability of populism to cut across left-right lines, all contributors 
agree on the chameleon-like character of populism and argue that while right-wing 
populism pits the people against a cultural elite, left-wing populism pits the people 
against an economic elite. Focusing on the commonalities, Bonikowski suggests that 
consistent across both types is the moral opposition between the elites and people. He 
 4 
adds that neither phenomena are new, discussing examples from Latin America and 
the US. Kaufmann contends that it is also important to appreciate the distinctions 
between the two phenomena. For example, radical right voters are not motivated by 
material concerns in the way that radical left voters are. Halikiopoulou is highly 
critical of using populism as a buzzword to describe a variety of phenomena that in 
fact differ fundamentally from one another. Rooduijn suggests that, while indeed a 
range of far right and far left parties have become increasingly populist in the past 
decades, we must not assume that all far right and far left parties are populist.  
 
With regards to the relationship between populism and nationalism, all contributors 
share concerns about the conceptual confusion between the two terms. They agree 
that nationalism and populism are not necessarily the same, although they do have 
elective affinities and often- but not always- coincide. The contributors’ views, 
however, diverge on what a conceptual disaggregation of the two terms entails and 
how different types of nationalism relate to populism. Bonikowski argues that 
although analytically distinct, populism and nationalism (as well as authoritarianism) 
are all components of the radical right. Their fusion has given radical-right party 
narratives particular potency by channelling diffuse grievances into powerful out-
group resentments. Indeed, these ideas are so tightly coupled that in many cases, 
populism itself can serve as a dog-whistle for ethno-nationalism. 
 
Kaufmann, on the other hand, rejects the notion that most western populist right 
movements (he excludes Golden Dawn and the Eastern European parties) are ethno-
nationalist in the Kohnian sense because despite the remarks of extremists within such 
parties, they are not currently seeking to limit citizenship to members of the ethnic 
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majority nor to purge the nation of minority groups. He argues instead that the form 
of nationalism that currently characterises western populist right movements is what 
he terms ‘ethno-traditional nationalism’, i.e. the desire to maintain or protect the 
traditional ethnic character of the nation - which can make room for a minority 
presence, but not necessarily a ‘majority minority’ scenario. This narrative focuses on 
preventing rapid change to what is perceived to be the nation’s traditional ethnic 
composition.  
 
While Halikiopoulou agrees with Kaufmann that the term ‘ethnic nationalism’ is ill-
suited to describe the narratives of Western European far right parties, she suggests 
that the latter are adopting a civic nationalist narrative in order to augment their 
electoral appeal. This does not entail that their main focus is no longer the exclusion- 
or indeed the scapegoating- of the out-group. On the contrary, it entails that they are 
able to justify this exclusion on ideological rather than biological criteria of national 
belonging, by ‘speaking’ the language of democracy and liberalism. The civic 
nationalist narrative is, therefore, strategically beneficial for such parties, as it allows 
them to broaden their electoral appeal and enter mainstream ground. In this sense she 
agrees with Bonikowski that through their nationalist narratives these parties channel 
different grievances into out-group resentment. But she is more explicit in arguing 
that they are more successful doing this through the adoption of a civic, rather than an 
ethno-national narrative.   
 
Rooduijn applies the ethnic-civic distinction to the understanding of left and right-
wing populism. He suggests that the conceptual conflation between populism and 
nationalism often leads to the erroneous conclusion that populists are necessarily 
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nativists and argues that left-wing populists tend to combine their populism with the 
inclusive, civic variant of nationalism, whereas right-wing populists are more inclined 
to link their populist discourse to an exclusionary version of nationalism.  
 
Finally, in terms of the extent to which the phenomena in Europe and the West we 
term populist are comparable, all contributors consider the tensions between 
identifying commonalities that allow us to draw generalizable conclusions on the one 
hand, and appreciating the specificities of particular cases on the other. As such they 
agree that the populist phenomena are comparable, but that this it is important to point 
to variations between cases and identify patterns depending on case and circumstance. 
Rooduijn’s main point here is that despite their differences, these phenomena are 
comparable, because after all, comparability does not entail that the phenomena need 
to be identical. Bonikowski focuses on between-case variations, suggesting it is 
important to take into consideration the different role of various factors, for example 
race in the US and the refugee crisis in Europe. The overarching pattern, however, is 
the link between populism, nationalism and authoritarianism prevalent in many of the 
cases. When these combine, the result is an erosion of social democratic politics. The 
key to how this will develop is how the mainstream responds.  
 
Halikiopoulou also identifies patterns. She distinguishes between the predominance of 
the civic far right in Western Europe, ethnic far right in Eastern Europe and the far 
left in Southern Europe. The election of Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK she 
considers different phenomena, and suggests that Brexit is the best example of 
populism. Kaufmann contends that ethnocultural and demographic drivers are central 
to right-wing populism in the West, while material concerns are important for left-
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wing populism. He also distinguishes between Eastern and Western Europe. The 
former is characterized by trauma and humiliation from the past resulting in 
authoritarianism; the latter by an imperfect fit between ethnicity and politics which 
results in the prevalence of anti-immigration. Here he disagrees with Halikiopoulou 
who suggests that both cultural and economic concerns motivate voters within the 
context of the new transnational cleavage.  
 
In the next section of this article the contributors outline their arguments in detail, in 
response to four specific questions with regards to the relationship between populism 




Bart Bonikowski, Harvard University 
Daphne Halikiopoulou, University of Reading 
Eric Kaufmann, Birkbeck College, University of London 
Matthijs Rooduijn, University of Amsterdam 
 




Bart Bonikowski: There is considerable consensus in the political science literature 
concerning the core definition of populism: It is a form of politics predicated on a 
fundamental moral opposition between an irredeemably corrupt elite and a virtuous 
people, with the latter seen as the only legitimate source of political power (Mudde 
2007). The vilified elites are typically elected politicians, but, depending on the 
ideological orientation of the actors making populist claims, they can also include 
state bureaucrats, business leaders, intellectuals, representatives of organized labor, or 
any other dominant group perceived as having violated the interests of the people. 
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Furthermore, populism tends to be critical of intermediary democratic institutions, 
because they are seen as having been captured by elite interests and as constituting 
barriers to the people’s unmediated expression of their political will.  
 
This minimal definition demonstrates that populism is not inherently a left- or right-
wing phenomenon, but rather, that it is always employed as a framing device for 
other, more comprehensive ideologies, from socialism to ethno-nationalism. In the 
case of ethno-nationalist populism, the targets of moral vilification are not solely elite 
actors, but also ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural out-groups, which are perceived as 
threats to the “true” people. Having ostensibly co-opted elites for their own ends, such 
groups are blamed for a variety of social ills, from crime and economic problems to 
terrorism and cultural decay. 
 
Aside from these agreed-upon features of populism, there are remaining scholarly 
debates about both the nature and consequences of populist politics. These 
complexities tend to be glossed over in contemporary commentary on the topic, which 
often conflates populism with radical politics in general. Consequently, it is useful to 
consider some characteristics that should not be ascribed to populism. 
 
First, populism is not an ideology. It is not a thoroughly articulated theory of society 
with extensive prescriptions for social reform, nor is it a deeply held set of beliefs that 
shapes politicians’ policy behavior. Consequently, many scholars have relegated 
populism to the status of a “thin-centered” ideology that is always combined with 
other more coherent political positions. While useful, this approach still assumes that 
populism is an essential attribute of political actors: some are populist while others are 
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not. I would argue that instead, we should view populism as an attribute of political 
claims, that is, as a way of framing political messages. From this perspective, 
populism is something political actors do, not something they are. This allows for the 
possibility that the same politician may rely on populist claims in one setting but not 
in another. In this vein, my research on the United States has shown that populism can 
vary across the presidential campaigns of the same candidate and even across the 
duration of a single campaign, and that this variation is associated with the 
candidate’s relative position in the political field (Bonikowski and Gidron 2016). A 
discursive, rather than ideological, conception of populism can also make sense of the 
fact that Donald Trump ran a populist electoral campaign, but that his anti-elite 
rhetoric has subsided considerably since he took office. 
 
Second, populism is not inherently xenophobic, racist, or Islamophobic, nor is it 
necessarily predatory on democratic institutions. To ascribe to populism these 
characteristics is to conflate populism with two other related but analytically distinct 
phenomena: ethno-nationalism and authoritarianism. The radical right in Europe often 
combines all three elements, as did the Trump campaign in the United States, which is 
why commentators tend to assume their unity. When one looks beyond these 
examples, however, it becomes clear that populism need not rely on exclusionary 
nationalism, as in much contemporary radical-left politics from Bernie Sanders in the 
United States to Podemos in Spain, and that populism can be profitably used by 
mainstream political candidates without threatening the norms of democracy, as has 
long been the case in U.S. political discourse. And yet, populism has been particularly 
powerful on the radical right, where it has been effectively combined with a persistent 
vilification of immigrants, Muslims, and other minority groups, where majoritarian 
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claims have been used to challenge minority rights that are the heart of pluralist 
liberalism, and where democratic norms and institutions have been portrayed as 
inconvenient hurdles in the path of the people’s triumph over elite self-interest. This 
is so, because populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism share certain elective 
affinities that, when combined, make for a particularly potent source of political 
mobilization, a point to which I will return. 
 
Third, even when it does take on nationalist and authoritarian traits, populism is not 
simply an irrational form of politics. There is a tendency to see the grievances 
represented by populist parties and candidates solely as products of ignorance, 
prejudice, and demagoguery. While perhaps comforting to those who do not share the 
concerns of radical-right supporters, such an interpretation is itself a symptom of the 
deep chasm between the moral commitments of elite commentators and the 
perceptions and experiences of those who favor populist politics. To be sure, there are 
myriad worrisome anti-pluralist and socially regressive aspects to the radical right, 
but the structural forces that have led to the rise of this form of politics are real, and 
they are felt viscerally by those voters who are most affected by rapid social change. 
Without addressing economic dislocation, perceptions of collective status loss, and 
widespread social and cultural insecurity—as well as the reality of political 
polarization and ineffective governance—moralistic dismissals of voters attracted to 
ethno-nationalist populism are unlikely to reverse the contemporary tide of radical 
politics. At the same time, the challenge is to offer solutions to real grievances 
without legitimating exclusionary ideologies and infringing upon the rights and 
protections of minority groups. 
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Finally, populism is not new. It is tempting to view the current moment as 
unprecedented, but anti-elite politics have a long history in democratic societies, as do 
nationalism and authoritarianism. In Europe, variants of the current mix of populism 
and nationalism have their origins in the radical-right parties of the early 1980s, but 
they also carry disturbing echoes of the inter-War years (though one should be careful 
with overly simplistic parallels between the two periods) (Kitschelt 1995; Ziblatt 
2017). In the United States, multiple conceptions of nationhood, including those 
predicated on ethnoracial exclusion, have competed over the country’s entire history 
(Smith 1997) and populism has been so endemic that Martin Seymour Lipset saw it as 
a core attribute of U.S. political culture (Lipset 1989). Moreover, as Levitsky and 
Ziblatt (2018) argue, authoritarian, anti-elite, and exclusionary tendencies have 
always been present in contemporary democracies (accounting, for instance, for about 
a third of the population in the United States, on average). The question then is not 
why such ideational currents exist, but rather why they have found effective 
expression in the mainstream politics of the current historical period. 
 
Daphne Halikiopoulou: Populism draws on a fundamental dichotomy between ‘us’ 
the people and ‘them’ the elite (Mudde 2004). Populists claim to speak in the name of 
the people- an entity, which they deem both indivisible (Freeden 2017) and in direct 
confrontation with whatever elite they identify as the enemy (Vasilopoulou et al 
2014). There are long debates in the field about whether populism is an ideology, 
strategy or communication style (Mudde 2004; Brubaker 2017; for an overview of 
different perspectives see Gidron and Bonikowski 2013). Whether belief, tool or style 
however, what is important about populism is precisely the ideal type of society- of 
democratic politics- that it envisages.  
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Populism is a vision of legitimating collective choice. It is a worldview of how we 
make political decisions in society and how these decisions are justified. The key to 
populism is that it is both illiberal (Pappas, 2016) – or anti-pluralist- and democratic. 
The vision of democratic politics it offers is antithetical to liberal democracy because 
its key tenet is that decisions made in society are legitimate only if they are made 
from below; in other words if they reflect the general will of the people. Such 
decisions are not only legitimate but also morally superior (Riker 1982: xii). In this 
sense populism undermines constitutionalism, the Rule of law and parliamentary 
scrutiny. It does so on the premise that elite-level decisions, which involve liberal 
democratic institutional paths, lack legitimacy because they do not represent the 
popular will.  
 
Populism can therefore justify authoritarianism by invoking an anti-pluralist and 
illiberal form democracy. Its vision rests on the (pseudo) democratic premise of the 
supposed embodiment of the popular will. This is why I contest the view that 
populism is good for democratic politics because it gives a voice to the discontent 
neglected by the mainstream. Populism is toxic for democracy. The insistence on 
equating part of the people with all the people (Müller 2016) as well as the urgency 
with which those who wish to implement the will of the people react (Freeden 2017) 
are reminiscent of a number of dictatorial regimes claiming legitimacy from below. 
Take Freeden’s (2017) example of Brexit and the urgency with which politicians have 
sought to implement it, clashing with those who attempt to place it under the scrutiny 
of legislative and judicial institutions. This is a feature often found in authoritarian, 
not open societies (Freeden 2017:6). In simple terms, although in theory populism 
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draws on substantive democratic principles, in practice it undermines pluralist 
democracy.  
 
Eric Kaufmann: Populism, at root, is about anti-elitism. It can adapt to a range of 
ideologies such as Islam, socialism or ethno-nationalism. I partially agree with those 
(Mudde 2004; Stanley 2008) who view it as a ‘thin’ ideology that combines with 
other ‘thicker’ ones. However, one can take this characterisation too far. On this 
definition, nationalism is also a thin ideology: it can adapt to liberalism, socialism, 
multiculturalism, religion and racism. Moreover, other ideologies can be combined, as 
with Christian socialism, so the thin-thick prefix is a matter of degree rather than a 
categorical distinction. 
 
Populism also entails a conception of the ‘people’ as a morally superior entity to the 
elite. This notion of the general will – and the associated concept of the common good 
- is viewed by some as anti-pluralist, and therefore illiberal and anti-democratic 
(Müller 2017: 102). Yet even established politicians invoke concepts such as ‘the 
people’ and the common good so I tend to consider these idioms of democratic 
politics rather than monistic attempts to quash difference. Once again, there is no hard 
line between populism and normal democratic politics. 
 
Indeed, it can be argued that many useful ideas, including freedom of speech, 
universal manhood suffrage and the labour movement emerged on the back of 
populist political movements. This is because – notably in majoritarian systems - 
parties may be coalitions of interests in which local party ‘franchises’ can air their 
interests but only an approved subset filters up to the national political arena (Carty 
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2002). Elites sharing common outlooks, social backgrounds and interests can rise to 
the top of parties and commandeer their factions, thereby removing particular 
policies, worldviews or discursive styles from contestation. They may also be socially 
connected to the upper echelons of the bureaucracy and judiciary. Thus established 
forms of pluralism may prevent other interests from being expressed. So while 
populism can endanger liberal democracy, it may also renew and invigorate it, 
enhancing pluralism. 
 
Populism can be both a sincere belief or a style deployed by a politician who is in fact 
committed to retaining the status quo. V.O. Key’s landmark (1949) study of populism 
in the southern United States in the early twentieth century showed how many 
populists – apart from mavericks like Huey Long in Louisiana - played to the 
common man during elections but subsequently became co-opted by the elite or 
essentially maintained policies that benefited that elite. Thus populism becomes a 
style designed to manipulate an emotive electorate to benefit those who wish to enter 
the elite. 
 
Matthijs Rooduijn: Populism is an essentially contested concept. It deals with “an 
essential impalpability, an awkward conceptual slipperiness” (Taggart, 2000: 1). The 
term could be used to refer to a small-scale bottom-up movement, a strong 
charismatic leader, or a radical right political party. It is therefore not strange that 
there are many different definitions out there. Nonetheless, many scholars nowadays 
agree that populism is an ideational phenomenon (a discourse, thin ideology or style) 
that concerns the antagonistic relationship between the good people and the evil elite 
(Hawkins 2010; Moffitt 2016; Mudde 2004). Kirk Hawkins (2009: 1042), for 
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instance, defines populism as “a Manichean discourse that identifies Good with a 
unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite”. According to Cas Mudde 
(2004: 543) it is “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt 
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale 
(general will) of the people”.  
 
Ideational definitions of populism imply that populism should be distinguished from 
phenomena such as political opportunism, far right politics or charismatic leadership. 
Most such definitions (including the ones presented above) are “minimal definitions” 
that, because they only include the core attributes of a concept, can be employed to 
compare ideologically divergent populist actors across cases and over time (see 
Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). 
 
Defining populism as an ideational feature has two important implications. First, it 
means that populism could – or maybe even should – be conceived of as a matter of 
degree. Parties can be more or less populist (Hawkins 2009; Jagers & Walgrave 2007; 
Rooduijn et al. 2014). In other words: a party that strongly endorses the populist set of 
ideas is strongly populist, whereas a party that does not employ much populism in its 
discourse is only weakly populist. Second, this line of reasoning can also be applied 
to other actors than political parties; other actors – like media (Mazzoleni 2003) or 
citizens (Akkerman et al. 2014) – can be more or less populist too. 
 
According to the “two-strand model of democracy”, a liberal democracy consists of 
two pillars: a democratic pillar and a liberal one (see Mouffe 2005). The core 
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characteristic of the democratic pillar is popular sovereignty: the idea that political 
power should reside within the people. According to the liberal pillar, however, the 
power of the people should be curbed (by means of checks and balances and minority 
rights) because of the always looming danger of a “tyranny of the majority”.  
 
Populism is very well compatible with the democratic pillar. After all, populists 
believe that the general will should be expressed as directly and unmediated as 
possible (Canovan 1981). Populism is hostile, however, towards liberal democracy 
(Taggart 2000), because the institutions of liberal democracy stand in the way of the 
direct expression of the volonté générale. According to populists, checks and balances 
and minority rights delay the decision-making process, and political compromises 
lead to a lack of decisiveness. Populism is therefore essentially democratic, but, at the 
same time, hostile toward liberal democracy.  
 
Although it might therefore be argued that populism poses a threat to liberal 
democracy, it is important to add that populists can also act as a force for good, 
because they often function as a democratic corrective (see Rovira Kaltwasser 2012): 
they channel political discontent and put issues that are neglected by mainstream 
parties on the political agenda. 
 
2. Does populism cut across left-right lines?  
 
Daphne Halikiopoulou: Yes. Populism can be understood as an umbrella term that 
includes all movements, or parties, which pit the ‘pure people’ against the ‘corrupt 
elites’- the minimal definition of populism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). The 
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definition of the people and the elites changes depending on whether a party is on the 
right or the left of the political spectrum. The right focuses on immigration and 
national sovereignty- the people is defined as ‘us’ the natives, who should have access 
to the collective goods of the state; and the elites are those corrupt outsiders and their 
collaborators, who seek to undermine ‘our’ sovereignty. The left, on the other hand, 
focuses on economic exploitation and inequality- the people are ‘us’, the exploited 
and economically deprived, while the elites are those associated with free trade, 
globalisation and Western imperialism (Brubaker 2017). There is also a mainstream, 
or centrist, variety: those who speak the language of populism by identifying the 
people against the governing party or the main opposition (Vasilopoulou et al 2014).  
 
While it is useful to develop typologies that distinguish left and right populism, the 
chameleon-like nature of populism reveals an important conceptual flaw in the way 
that we use the term today to explain the rise of- and electoral support for- a variety of 
political parties. The electoral success of almost every party, which is outside the 
mainstream, is described as ‘populism’. Examples range from the French Front 
National (FN), the Dutch Freedom Party (PPV), the Greek Golden Dawn (GD) and 
the Hungarian	Fidesz	on right to the Spanish Podemos and the Greek Coalition for 
the Radical Left (SYRIZA) on the left. The term has also been applied to political 
outcomes that have enjoyed support across the political spectrum- for example Brexit; 
and even centrist Macron.  
 
Everyone is- or can be- a populist. But this begs the question: who is not a populist? 
Simply put, what is the analytical utility of a term, which describes a variety of very 
different political parties and movements, and groups them together by virtue of their 
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common references to the people- something which is a given in every democracy? 
This could mean that populism is a tautology: if it explains everything, it explains 
nothing.  
 
In order for populism to be analytically meaningful, and for a left-right typology of 
populism to make sense, we need to be able to first identify what is not populism. For 
example, for the radical right-wing populist category to be meaningful, we need to be 
able to identify a party on the far right of the political spectrum that emphasises 
national sovereignty and is anti-immigrant but at the same time is not populist. 
Similarly for the radical left-wing populist category, we need to identify a party that 
mobilises on inequality and economic exploitation without the populist element. This 
is a point both about the (im)possibility of theoretical counterfactuals and the 
existence of such cases empirically. This exercise will allow us to distinguish between 
a variety of different groups which all challenge liberal democracy in different ways 
(Pappas 2016).   
 
Eric Kaufmann: Clearly. Left-wing populism tends to be focused on defining the 
people against an economic elite – those with wealth and power. It stigmatises 
bankers, the rich and corporations. Right-wing populism defines the people against a 
cultural elite – those who fail to back the cultural concerns of the ethnic majority or 
nation; or who support liberal and secular ideas which can erode cultural traditions. 




The two forms may blend together, but are often distinct. For instance, voters for 
UKIP, the Front National, Sweden Democrats or Donald Trump’s Republicans are not 
really motivated by a distaste for the rich and powerful. The British Election Study 
(Fieldhouse et. al. 2018) asks five questions on anti-elitism such as ‘the people not 
politicians, should make our most important policy decisions’ or ‘politicians in the 
UK parliament need to follow the will of the people.’ This doesn’t distinguish UKIP 
or Brexit voters from left-wing voters whereas views on immigration or economic 
inequality do. Immigration is the leading issue for 40 percent of Leavers but just 5 
percent of Remainers. Inequality is the most important concern for 20 percent of 
Remainers but just 5 percent of Leavers. Immigration is the leading issue for 25 
percent of those who rated Trump a 10 out of 10 during the primaries whereas just 2 
percent of those giving him a 0 out of 10 prioritise it. For inequality the numbers are 
reversed: 37 percent of anti-Trumpers rank it their top issue against just 2 percent of 
strong Trump supporters (Kaufmann 2016). Populism means very different things to 
right-wing and left-wing voters. 
 
In March 2017, I asked 361 white American voters in an opt-in MTurk survey, ‘What 
annoys you most about the American elite?’ Respondents could answer ‘they don’t 
annoy me,’ ‘they are rich and powerful,’ or ‘they are politically correct.’ Clinton 
voters were actually marginally more annoyed than Trump voters by the American 
elite. However, what distinguished partisans was which elite they resented: 34 percent 
of Trump voters but just 9 percent of Clinton voters were exercised by the political 
correctness of the American elite, whereas 55 percent of Clinton voters (against 27 
percent of Trump voters) were bothered by their wealth and power. While there is a 
current of resentment at the wealth and power of the elite across the population, 
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controlling for demographics, what really distinguishes supporters of right-wing 
populism from the left are cultural considerations. This also means right-wing 
populism is issue-driven, not anti-system or even anti-political elite. Therefore 
mainstream parties can win populist right voters back by campaigning on immigration 
and identity issues, as with, among others, Mark Rutte in the Netherlands, Theresa 
May in Britain and Sebastian Kurz in Austria. 
 
Matthijs Rooduijn: Absolutely. Paul Taggart (2000) has convincingly argued that 
populism has an empty heart. It does not have core ideological values (except for its 
populist message itself), as a result of which it tends to be highly chameleonic: it 
adapts itself to the environment in which it occurs. Populism can, in other words, be 
combined with basically ever ideology – from far left to far right and from ultra 
conservative to highly progressive. Nonetheless, populism can most often be 
encountered on the fringes of the political spectrum (Rooduijn & Akkerman 2017) – 
at least in contemporary Western Europe.  
 
Present-day far left and right parties are likely to be populist because they have gone 
through some essential changes in the last couple of decades. First, the extreme left 
(communism) and right (fascism) have been marginalized. Far left and right parties 
generally do not attack the democratic system in its entirety anymore. Instead, they 
now criticize the established elite. In other words, they accept the democratic rules of 
the game. Moreover, their respective focus on the proletariat and the nation has been 
supplemented with the glorification of “ordinary citizens”. They have, to sum up, 
become increasingly anti-elitist and people-centrist.   
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That radical left and right parties are inclined to be populist does not mean that all 
radical parties are populist or that all populist parties are radical. The Rassemblement 
National (National Rally, previously Front National), for instance, was not yet very 
populist in the 1970s. The Movimento Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement) in Italy is 
strongly populist, but cannot be categorized as either radical left or radical right.   
 
Bart Bonikowski: Because populism is not itself an ideology, it can be mobilized in 
the pursuit of any political project, on both sides of the political spectrum (Rooduijn 
and Akkerman 2017). One can blame allegedly corrupt political elites for siding with 
immigrants and minorities, as do many contemporary radical-right candidates, but 
populism can also frame economic claims about the ostensible complicity of elites in 
maintaining an oppressive capitalist system, as do left-wing candidates in Europe and 
the United States. What is consistent across both types of arguments is the essential 
moral opposition between the elites and the people that animates all populist 
discourse. While European right-wing populism received more attention from the 
media and scholars during much of the 1990s and 2000s, recent years have seen an 
increased focus on radical-left populism, largely due to the rise of viable left-populist 
parties and candidates in Southern Europe (e.g., SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in 
Spain), as well as in the United States (most notably, Bernie Sanders). Evidence of the 
ideologically bimodal distribution of populism, however, is not new. There are 
numerous historical examples of both right- and left-wing populism in Latin America, 
ranging from Juan Perón to Hugo Chávez, and in the United States, where decades 
before Father Coughlin, George Wallace, Richard Nixon, or Pat Buchanan, the late-
19th-century populist agrarian movement waged a sustained battle against urban 
moneyed interests. In Europe too, socialist parties have long mixed Marxist ideology 
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with populist appeals intended to resonate beyond their working class base (March 
2011). 
 
Even though populism is ideologically flexible, the question remains whether its left 
wing variants are necessarily inclusive, while those on the right are more likely to 
invoke exclusionary ideas targeted at ethnic, racial, and religious minority groups. 
There is considerable empirical evidence from contemporary politics to support such 
a conclusion (Judis 2016), but this does not imply that left-wing populism is by 
definition immune from xenophobia and chauvinism. The U.S. labor movement, for 
instance, has had a history of vilifying immigrants and African Americans in defense 
of white working-class union members (Hill 1996). Demands for the protection or 
expansion of welfare state institutions can also be easily coupled with restrictive 
conceptions of those deserving of state support, as in much European welfare 
chauvinism. Interestingly, the latter position is often viewed as an indicator of right-
wing populist tendencies, which in turn demonstrates the difficulty of reducing 
political ideology to a single dimension. Finally, to further complicate matters, there 
are examples of populist parties that defy a simple left-right classification, such as the 
Italian Five Star Movement, as well as of radical-right parties in Western Europe that 
increasingly rely on culturally essentialist versions of civic nationalism to portray 
Islam as incompatible with European liberal values. 
 
Another way to think about the distinction between left- and right-wing populism is to 
consider factors that have contributed to the relative success of each. There are some 
marked differences in the proximate policy issues that motivate supporters of each 
camp, which correspond to the content of the latter’s populist appeals. Radical-left 
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voters are concerned primarily with the economy, while those on the radical-right 
tend to prioritize immigration as the most urgent social problem. At the root of these 
divergent preferences, however, is a common sense of collective status threat. While 
those on the left perceive their group position primarily through the prism of 
occupational and educational status, those on the right—with the encouragement of 
right-wing media and politicians—tend to define their common belonging in terms of 
race and nationhood. Indeed, the same underlying grievances associated with 
economic globalization can be channeled by elites in either direction, depending on 
the structural and discursive opportunities in a given national context; this may 
explain the geographic distribution of left- and right-wing populism across world 
regions (Rodrik 2018). In both cases, the primary concern of voters is with the unfair 
treatment of people “like them” by those who wield power, which is made all the 
more acute amidst conditions of economic—and for the radical-right supporters, 
cultural and demographic—uncertainty. What is at stake is not only objective 
wellbeing, but also subjective perception of having been socially devalued by elites 
whose status is assured by their high levels of cultural and economic capital (Cramer 
2016; Gidron and Hall 2017). And on both sides of the political spectrum, such 
concerns are compounded by alienation from a political system that is controlled by 
those same elites (and their allies) and not everyday people. 
 
3. What is the relationship between nationalism and populism? 
 
Eric Kaufmann: Nationalism began with the movement to recast the basis of 
sovereignty from the monarch to ‘the people.’ Whatever else the French Revolution 
was, it was certainly populist. Once the revolution succeeded, the question became 
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‘Who are “the People” .’ The events after 1792 showed that foreign revolutionaries 
like Anacharsis Cloots might not to be considered French (Giraudon 1991). So began 
the vexed question of defining the French nation. We see in these events an umbilical 
connection between democracy, nationalism and populism with a common thread 
being ‘the people’ rather than the elite as the fount of political legitimacy.  
 
Where lie the differences? Consider elite-led nationalisms. The Quebec nationalism of 
the Parti Québécois (PQ) or Scottish nationalism of the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
is led by regional elites against the national elites at Ottawa or Westminster. Members 
of the regional political establishment, notably cultural elites in arts and letters, 
spearhead and lead the movement. They are nationalist in the sense of seeking to 
redefine ‘the people’ away from all inhabitants of the state to those of the sub-state 
nation. However, social hierarchies are not disrupted and these sub-state nationalists 
may even advance an anti-traditionalist cultural agenda. In the case of the PQ and 
SNP, for instance, separatism went along with support for social liberalism, 
immigration and a ‘civic’ definition of the nation.  
 
Many of the separatist movements that emerged out of empires, from the Ottoman 
and Habsburg to the Soviet, likewise preserved the integrity of regional political elites 
and social hierarchies. There are exceptions. In some instances, where the local elite 
was aligned with the universal church or empire, it fell to lower strata to champion the 
nation. This was the case in Serbia and Bulgaria within the Ottoman Empire where 
the native aristocracy had been Islamised or replaced by Turkish landlords. The native 
lower clergy and merchant class provided the nationalist leadership, harnessing anti-
landlord sentiment (Sugar 1969: 46-54). Indeed one Serbian nationalist leader was a 
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pig farmer. Anti-landlordism was also important in the Irish nationalism of the Land 
League in the 1880s and 90s. 
 
Populist nationalism can also emerge when elites fail to win public support for their 
political project. The Easter Rising of 1916 was led by men like Patrick Pearse who 
initially called for a secular non-sectarian Irish nation – a relatively elite 
understanding of Irish nationhood. In order to rally public support, they needed to tap 
into the Catholic sentiments which were much closer to the lived experience of most 
people. At other times, populist nationalists may outflank elite nationalists, as with the 
BJP’s Hindu nationalist challenge to the anti-colonial socialist nationalism of 
Congress. 
 
The right-wing populist nationalism we see in western Europe, Australasia and the 
United States is arrayed against a ‘globalist’ cultural elite, a category which includes 
sections of the political and economic elite. Rather than viewing this elite as 
cosmopolitan, it is better to think of the liberal elite in the West before 2015 as 
missionary nationalist (Kumar 2003). That is, competing with other western national 
elites for prestige: to be first among equals in the advancement of western liberal 
ideals. The process is similar to the way Iran and Saudi Arabia compete to be the 
Muslim world’s favoured Islamic torchbearer. The ‘new nationalism’ is an 
ethnonationalist challenge to liberal missionary nationalism. It targets the liberal-
egalitarian norms which dominate the high culture of the West and are seen to be 
eroding the preponderance of the ethnic majority through mass immigration and 
multiculturalism. The Islamic ‘threat’ to liberalism is a factor, but not the main one: it 
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played no part in the rise of Haider in Austria and only a modest role in the success of 
UKIP and Trump. Terrorism is only an issue in some western countries. 
 
Opposition to the erosion of political sovereignty is an issue for UKIP and 
protectionism is part of Trump’s appeal, but in both cases data shows that their 
support base is motivated far more by threats to majority ethnic preponderance (‘I 
don’t recognise my country’). Secularism, meanwhile, is only a bugbear for Polish 
populists. Indeed, the Trump phenomenon represents a secular-nationalist break from 
the politics of the religious right which shaped the Republican Party in the 1990s and 
early 2000s. The religious right worked to capture offices within the system rather 
than overthrow it, thus was less overtly populist. Trump’s base is instead motivated 
by the same majority-ethnic considerations that brook large in Europe, and has sought 
to oust the existing ‘globalist’ Republican elite in the RNC and parts of the Senate. 
 
Matthijs Rooduijn: Nationalism focuses on the congruence of the cultural and the 
political community (i.e., the nation and the state) (see Freeden 1998; Gellner 1983). 
It could be defined as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to 
constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’” (Smith 2010: 9). Scholars often make a 
distinction between two types of nationalism: ethnic and civic nationalism. Civic 
nationalism is said to be inclusive and emphasizes the legal political community. 
Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, is said to be exclusive and to focus much more 
strongly on cultural matters (Zimmer 2003).  
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Nationalism and populism thus have in common that they focus on an in-group: the 
nation in the case of nationalism and the people in the case of populism. They can 
therefore easily be combined with each other. However, left-wing populists tend to 
combine their populism with the inclusive, civic variant of nationalism, whereas right-
wing populists are more inclined to link their populist discourse to an exclusionary 
version of nationalism (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2012; see also Halikiopoulou 
et al. 2012 regarding Euroscepticism). 
 
It is important to emphasize that it is of the upmost importance that researchers do not 
conflate populism and nationalism. Although the two concepts are related, they 
represent different phenomena. The danger of conceptual sloppiness looms in 
particular when it comes to nativism – one specific form of nationalism. Nativism can 
be defined as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by 
members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that non-native elements (persons and 
ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” (Mudde 2007: 
19), and is the main ideological ingredient of the radical right. 
 
Because many of the most successful and famous contemporary populists are radical 
right-wing populists (Trump, Le Pen, Wilders), some commentators have come to the 
conclusion that populists are necessarily nativists. This is not the case. Only think of 
parties like Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece. Populism is about the vertical 
antagonism between “the people” and “the elite”, whereas nativism concerns the 
horizontal relationship between “the nation” and “dangerous others”. 
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It is important to emphasize that although the concepts of populism and nativism 
should be distinguished from each other, we should also realize that they are 
nevertheless closely related. Both could be perceived of as concrete manifestations of 
general in-group/out-group thinking. In other words: both sets of ideas tap into a more 
general predisposition to divide the world into “us” and “them”.  
 
Bart Bonikowski: If populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are analytically 
distinct components of radical-right politics, why do they often co-occur, both in 
voters’ beliefs and the appeals of candidates and parties? One way to think about their 
relationship is in terms of elective affinity (Weber 2010), with each pair within the 
triad sharing certain points of articulation that make their combination particularly 
fruitful. Because populism is a culturally thin phenomenon with few ideological 
entailments, the content of the binary categories of the corrupt elites and the virtuous 
people must be filled with substantive content that draws on more complete 
ideologies. 
 
The construction of the elites is typically relatively straightforward: left-wing 
populism tends to target economic elites, while right-wing populism focuses on 
elected officials, civil servants, and intellectuals. The definition of the people is more 
difficult, however, because the ostensible claim to speak for the entire polity does not 
lend itself to cleavage-based politics. As a result, populist claims often rely on vague 
language, such as first-person plural pronouns. While this allows members of any 
group to see themselves as represented by the speaker, political claims are more 
powerful when they galvanize an in-group identity (Mason 2018). One tried-and-true 
method for doing so is to activate strong feelings of ethno-national identification. 
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By increasing the salience of otherwise latent cultural cleavages concerning the 
meaning of nationhood, which are present in all democratic societies, radical-right 
actors are able to channel diffuse grievances, both economic and cultural, into 
powerful out-group resentments (Bonikowski 2017a). Voters who espouse restrictive 
nationalist beliefs (Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016; Bonikowski 2017b) see in 
populist politicians the promise that the rightful stewards of the “real” nation can turn 
the tide of cultural change and return the nation to its past glory, when the aggrieved 
majority unapologetically occupied a position of power. Nationalism infused with 
populism enables a politics of resentment and nostalgia, which is as much a battle 
against elites as it is a reassertion of dominance over ethnic, racial, and cultural 
minorities. Indeed, anti-elite claims can become a dog-whistle for ethno-nationalism, 
giving the latter plausible deniability and an air of respectability (Bonikowski and 
Zhang 2017). At the same time, because the political opposition is framed as a 
morally corrupt enemy of the nation, this justifies extraordinary measures against 
them, even if they require the violation of democratic norms (Levitsky and Ziblatt 
2018). It is this zero-sum view of politics that explains why populism and 
authoritarianism are often mutually reinforcing. 
 
Daphne Halikiopoulou: Populism and nationalism both place an emphasis on the 
collective. They have teleological visions and posit that the society they envisage is 
morally superior. In addition, they are both divisive, feeding off the creation of 
dichotomies and the categorisation of social groups behind conflict lines. But while 




It is possible to be both populist and nationalist- and indeed a number of parties that 
we term ‘right-wing populist’ are. But it must also be possible for a populist not to be 
a nationalist and vice versa. This point is similar to my point above about left and 
right populism. It must be conceptually and empirically possible for the two 
categories to be distinct in order for them to be analytically useful.  
 
This is where the concepts of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ populism become problematic. Thin 
populism is the minimal definition that focuses on the antagonistic relationship 
between the ‘pure people’ and the corrupt elite (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012). Given, 
however, that references to the people are widespread in a democracy, this minimal 
definition is often criticised as not enough (Brubaker 2017). ‘Thick’ populism then 
adds more dimensions to the people versus elites axis, for example an inclusion/ 
exclusion axis i.e. nationalism (Brubaker 2017). But herein lies the problem: we often 
end up defining a party or movement as populist not because of its populist attributes, 
but because of other attributes, such as its nationalism or radicalism. In this case, what 
does the categorisation of a party as populist, in addition to nationalist and/or radical 
add to our understanding?  To put it another way: if nationalism is always a feature of 
the radical right- as the literature agrees- what then is the difference between a radical 
right-wing party and a populist radical right-wing party?  
 
There is greater explanatory power in nationalism than there is in populism I would 
argue. Nationalism is a helpful concept when understood as a supply-side driver of 
radical right party support. Parties use it in their programmatic agendas to mobilise 
voters by portraying their solutions to multiple insecurities as legitimate. In Western 
Europe successful radical right- wing parties have done this by abandoning ethnic 
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nationalism and adopting instead a civic variety which ‘speaks’ the language of 
democracy and stresses liberal values, in order to justify their exclusionary agendas 
(Halikiopoulou et al., 2013).  
 
4. Are contemporary populist movements across Europe and the West 
comparable? 
 
Matthijs Rooduijn: Absolutely. Scholars categorize such movements as populist 
precisely because they have something in common: their people-centrism and anti-
elitism (Rooduijn 2014). It makes perfect sense to compare parties and movements 
that employ similar discourses – even if they operate within strongly divergent 
political contexts.  
 
However, it is also important to emphasize that populist parties are not necessarily 
similar parties. Quite the contrary. There are huge differences between, for instance, 
Podemos and UKIP. Although these parties are both populist (and also Eurosceptic), 
they strongly differ from each other when it comes to their ideas about salient 
ideological issues like immigration, law and order and social justice. It is of essential 
importance to keep these differences in mind when comparing such parties. 
 
Giovanni Sartori’s “ladder of abstraction” (1970) is of the upmost importance in this 
respect. Sartori’s general message is that it is perfectly legitimate to compare apples 
with oranges. They have, after all, a lot in common. Although apples and oranges 
differ from each other regarding taste, texture and color, both are eatable, and both 
come from a plant (i.e., are types of fruit). The same holds true for populists across 
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Western countries. They might be different in many respects, but that does not mean 
that they are not comparable.       
 
Bart Bonikowski: There is an inherent tension in identifying shared characteristics 
across instances of populist politics while remaining attuned to the specificities of 
each case. Between-country variation, shaped by distinct historical trajectories of 
individual polities, is considerable, as evidenced by differences in electoral systems 
and governance institutions, in salient nationalist narratives and characteristics of 
perceived out-groups, and in the specific events that catalyze the success of populist 
parties. The Trump election, for instance, cannot be understood without attention to 
the history of racial domination in the United States, long-term patterns of migration 
from Mexico and other Latin American countries, the persistent vilification of 
President Obama, the peculiarities of the primary system and the Electoral College, 
and the strengthening of partisan identification associated with increasing 
polarization. In many European countries, by contrast, race is less significant than 
ethnicity and religion in fueling nationalist appeals, the refugee crisis is much more 
salient than labor migration, parliamentary systems present hurdles for populist 
upstarts (while coalition politics have countervailing enabling effects), and 
polarization manifests itself through weakened party affiliation and the fragmentation 
of party systems. Even within clusters of broadly similar causal factors, such as 
grievances associated with economic globalization, there are important regional 
differences, with trade shocks being particularly relevantr in the United States and the 
United Kingdom (Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Majlesi 2016; Colantone and Stanig 
2018), and financial integration and capital mobility playing a larger role in 
continental Europe (Guiso, Herrera, and Morelli 2017; Rodrik 2018). 
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Yet, despite these important country specificities, it is possible to identify overarching 
patterns that lend themselves to general explanations. The formal structure of populist 
claims and the links between populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism are 
remarkably similar across cases. The moral vilification of elites, the appeal to the 
purity and political sovereignty of the people, and the portrayal of the political system 
as having failed the latter are present in the appeals of most radical candidates, both 
on the radical left and the radical right. The association of anti-elitism with the 
disparagement of minorities—whether immigrants, Muslims, or racial minorities—is 
a primary feature of right-wing populist politics across Western countries. While 
varied in their specifics and relative importance, the causal factors shaping the relative 
successes of radical actors tend to operate via similar mechanisms as well: the 
perceived threat to the collective status of dominant groups in society, with their 
identity conceived of in either economic or ethnocultural terms. Finally, these 
grievances are turned against political elites, as mainstream parties are increasingly 
seen as unresponsive, detached from voters, and ideologically undifferentiated.  
 
The result is an erosion of social democratic politics, a rightward drift of traditional 
conservative parties, and a rise of radical challengers who further delegitimize 
conventional party politics, with potentially destabilizing consequences for liberal 
democracy as a whole. What remains to be seen is whether traditional parties will 
offer a steadfast defense of democratic norms (particularly from the center-right 
[Ziblatt 2017]) and develop a meaningful vision for the future that offers an 
alternative to the majoritarian and anti-system tendencies of the radical right (this is 
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especially relevant for the center-left). Thus far, the evidence on both fronts is far 
from reassuring. 
 
Daphne Halikiopoulou: We tend to use populism as an umbrella term to cover a 
broad range of political outcomes, from the rise of the radical left and the radical right 
in Europe to the election of Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK. These phenomena 
are in fact very different, elected on different platforms. This does not mean that they 
are not comparable, as comparability does not necessarily imply that the phenomena 
we are trying to explain need to be identical, or similar in everything. It does, 
however, entail some overarching commonality. If this is absent, then comparability 
is limited. This is not just a theoretical problem. It is important because it goes to the 
core of our explanations of why particular parties are increasing their electoral 
support. If these are different phenomena not sharing an overarching commonality, 
then their rise cannot be traceable to a single cause (Pappas, 2016). 
 
For the reasons outlined above I am not convinced that populism is enough of an 
overarching commonality to allow us to identify a single cause behind these diverse 
political phenomena. To understand them we need to identify different patterns. With 
regards to the niche parties of both the right and the left that have garnered increasing 
electoral support across Europe, which I suggest are more adequately labelled ‘far 
right’ and ‘far left’, I see three patterns. Trump and Brexit I consider different 
phenomena; Brexit in my view is the best example of populism.   
 
In North-west Europe we may observe the increasing salience of value issues, related 
to the emergence of a post-materialist cleavage (Hooghe and Marks 2017). This does 
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not mean that material considerations are irrelevant, but rather that this cleavage is 
characterised by the interplay between economy and culture. Successful niche parties 
tend to be of the far right variety. They cater for voters’ various insecurities including 
material and value-based by scapegoating immigration: i.e. by claiming that 
immigration is the core cause of a broad range of societal problems including 
terrorism, job scarcity and the erosion of national values. What unites these parties is 
a civic nationalist rhetoric that excludes on ideological rather than biological criteria.  
 
In Southern Europe on the other hand the economy remains more salient within the 
context of the prevalence of material concerns, reinforced by severity of the economic 
crisis. Successful niche parties are mainly of the radical left variety, with the 
exception of Greece, which experienced both the rise of the radical left SYRIZA and 
the extreme right GD. These parties draw primarily on economic narratives, even the 
GD which stresses the economy more than immigration in its manifestos 
(Halikiopoulou et al., 2016). In Eastern Europe the dynamics are different, with 
authoritarianism prominent across the board. This is partly a legacy of the communist 
experience (Pirro, 2014). 
 
The Trump and Brexit phenomena are different. These are not niche parties operating 
in the fringes of the party system. Trump is the elected representative of one of the 
two major parties in the US. Many of his voters would have been traditional 
Republican voters, opting for the party regardless. Why this candidate became elected 
is an important question but a different question to why small, niche parties enter and 
influence party systems in Europe. Similarly, Brexit - driven by both cultural and 
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economic insecurity (Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2017)- was supported by both major 
UK parties and reflected Eurosceptic views that are not new to Britain.  
 
Despite the fact that it has been supported by much of the political establishment in 
the UK, Brexit is a better example of populism than the emergence- or persistence- of 
the radical parties described above. While populism just one attribute of these parties, 
which use it in their rhetoric to varying extents, it is the defining feature of Brexit. 
This is why. Its implementation has been sought with urgency and emotion (Freeden 
2017), and rests upon a resentment of pluralist institutions and procedures that might 
place it under parliamentary and judicial scrutiny. Premised on the outcome of a 
referendum that pitted the ‘people’ against the liberal, cosmopolitan elites, its 
legitimacy lies in the belief that the outcome is somehow morally right because it 
embodies the popular will. Brexit, in other words, is premised on the moral 
superiority of a decision that has been made from below. It has translated the modest 
majority of those who voted into a claim about the whole people and the indivisibility 
of that people. To return to the question about the nature of populism and democratic 
politics, the problem is that, of course, ‘the people’ are never all the people.  
 
Eric Kaufmann: I think the dividing line falls between eastern and western Europe, 
with the Anglosphere similar to western Europe. I conceive of two forms of 
nationalism: one concerned with overcoming trauma and humiliation from the past, 
the second focused on addressing the ‘imperfect’ fit between ethnicity and politics. 
The former is an important ingredient in fascism and militarism and is only important 
in contemporary East European right-wing populism. The latter encompasses 
secessionist, risorgimento and anti-immigration nationalisms and is a bigger concern 
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in the West. As Brubaker (2017) notes, Visegrad countries along the route of the 
Migrant Crisis are upset about immigration for largely symbolic reasons to do with a 
resentment of imperialism. Refugee quotas are considered the latest in a series of 
humiliations and impositions, from the Treaty of Trianon through Soviet occupation 
to EU domination. There is also the memory of an authoritarian period before the 
messy world of pluralist democracy, and nostalgia for a return to that world. 
Something of this spirit may also be detected in Greece’s Golden Dawn.  
 
By contrast, the western populist right is almost exclusively concerned with the ‘who 
are we?’ question thrown up by immigration and multiculturalism, including the anti-
colonial, anti-racist critique of national narratives. I see very little difference between 
parties like the FPÖ, FN and UKIP in Europe or Trump and New Zealand First in the 
Anglo settler societies. Even the black South African First movement is similar, 
though World Values Survey data on immigration attitudes suggests economic 
grievances may be playing a greater role there. The western movements are primarily 
motivated by the proportional decline of the ethnic majority in interaction with the 
rate of immigration. Both the minority level and rate of change are important – 
especially in an age when limited interstate war and ideological conflict have 
weakened state nationalism. The missionary nationalism represented by anti-
communism or neoconservatism is giving way to what I term ethno-traditional 
nationalism, in which culturally-conservative political actors within society mobilise 
against liberal missionary nationalists within the country. Outward-facing state 
nationalism based on political friction with other polities has retreated while an 
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